Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with committing the offense of assault in the third degree and was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was not adequately informed of his right to testify. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court’s right-to-testify colloquy was defective, and as a result, Defendant did not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his right to testify; (2) the constitutional violation of Defendant’s right to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction, and the prohibition against double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial in this case. View "State v. Pomroy" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of abuse of a family or household member. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the family court did not ensure that he had “fully” waived his right to a jury trial. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner had validly waived his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the family court’s judgment, holding that the family court failed to ensure that Petitioner’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was voluntary. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for attempted murder in the second degree. During the proceedings, Defendant expressed his desire to proceed pro se. The circuit court determined that Defendant waived his right to counsel, and Defendant was pro se for the rest of the trial. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Defendant’s standby counsel filed a motion to withdraw as standby counsel and that substitute counsel be appointed to assist Defendant post-trial and on appeal. The circuit court allowed standby counsel to withdraw but did not appoint substitute counsel for Defendant’s post-verdict motions or for sentencing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred (1) by not appointing substitute counsel for Defendant’s post-verdict motions because post-verdict proceedings are critical stages in the prosecution; and (2) by not appointing Defendant substitute counsel for sentencing. View "State v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with electronic enticement in the first degree (Count 1) and promoting child abuse in the third degree (Count 2). The charges were severed. The State then proceeded to trial on Count 1 and appealed the circuit court’s suppression order as it related to count 2. In relevant part, the court suppressed a statement made by Defendant after he was arrested and evidence seized from Defendant’s residence pursuant to a misdated search warrant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of electronic enticement. Both parties appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction and vacated the suppression order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction for electronic enticement; (2) suppression of Defendant’s statement was proper where law enforcement officers failed to obtain a voluntary waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights; and (3) the circuit court erred in suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. Remanded. View "State v. McKnight" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with abuse of family and household members. Prior to trial, a Korean language interpreter was sworn in to translate the proceedings for Petitioner. During the trial, Petitioner's attorney informed the court Petitioner was not going to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, claiming that his right to testify was violated because the court's Tachibana colloquy was deficient. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) under State v. Tachibana, a colloquy between the judge and a defendant involves a verbal exchange in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of his or her rights; (2) here, the advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether Petitioner understood his constitutional right to testify or not to testify; (3) further, Petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial heightened the necessity for the court to insure Petitioner understood the rights he waived; and (4) the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded. View "State v. Han" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 712-1240.8. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent term of imprisonment of five years in both counts as a young adult defendant pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-667. The State filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court's decision to sentence Defendant under section 706-667 ran contrary to law. The circuit court denied the order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing under section 712-1240.8. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "notwithstanding...any other law to the contrary" found in the sentencing provision of section 712-1240.8 overrode sentencing under section 706-667 as "contrary." The Supreme Court held that it did not, reversed the ICA's judgment, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and order denying the State's motion to correct illegal sentence.View "State v. Casugay-Badiang" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with harassment. Before trial commenced, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that disjunctive wording in the complaint made it difficult to prepare a defense. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because the complaint charged two forms of non-synonymous conduct disjunctively, the charge did not provide Defendant with adequate notice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when charging a defendant under a single subsection of a statute, the charge may be worded disjunctively in the language of the statute as long as the acts charged are reasonably related so that the charge provides sufficient notice to the defendant; and (2) the complaint in this case met due process requirements regardless of whether the disjunctively charged acts were synonymous or non-synonymous. View "State v. Codiamat" on Justia Law

Respondents, the City and County of Honolulu and certain individuals, banned Petitioners, two stagehands, from working at certain City-owned facilities based on Petitioners' involvement in a charitable concert featuring the City's mayor. After a jury-waived trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Respondents on all claims, including Petitioners' claims that the ban was unconstitutional. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding that the City's ban interfered with Petitioners' liberty interests under the Hawaii Constitution and that the City failed to satisfy due process by instituting the ban without giving Petitioners notice and an opportunity to be heard. Remanded. View "Minton v. Quintal" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a contract with Complainant for the purpose of remodeling part of Complainant's house. Complainant later discovered Defendant was not a licensed contractor, contrary to Defendant's representations to Complainant. Before the remodeling was completed, Complainant fired Defendant due to a dispute regarding the purchasing of materials. After an investigation, Defendant was charged with theft in the first degree and unlicensed activity. Defendant moved to dismiss the theft charge, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, determining that there was sufficient evidence for the grand jury to indict Defendant for first-degree theft given his misrepresentation to Complainant that he was an unlicensed contractor, which thereby induced Complainant to enter into a contract and pay Defendant $95,930 before ultimately firing him. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the circuit court and the ICA, holding that the evidence in this case did not suffice to establish probable cause that Defendant committed theft of property exceeding $20,000 in value because the State did not provide the grand jury with any specific amount of property of which Complainant was allegedly unlawfully deprived. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge of theft in the first degree. View "State v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical marijuana patient, was arrested for possessing medical marijuana while passing through airport security at Kona International Airport. Defendant was later convicted of promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded the case to the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal, holding (1) Defendant presented sufficient evidence to trigger a medical marijuana affirmative defense in a stipulated fact trial, in which the parties stipulated that Defendant possessed a valid medical marijuana certificate and that the marijuana he possessed was medical marijuana; and (2) the conflict between a statute that allows medical use of marijuana, including transportation of such marijuana, and another statute that prohibits transportation of medical marijuana through any place open to the public, created an irreconcilable conflict that must be resolved in favor of Defendant.View "State v. Woodhall" on Justia Law