Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

Following the devastating 2023 Lahaina wildfires in Maui, which caused significant loss of life and property, numerous victims initiated litigation against various parties including Hawaiian Electric, the State of Hawaiʻi, the County of Maui, and others. To manage the complex and large-scale proceedings, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit established a special coordination proceeding, appointed liaison counsel, and ultimately oversaw a $4.037 billion global settlement. A major issue arose regarding attorney fees: the court issued an order capping contingency fees, creating a $222 million Common Benefit Fund for attorneys whose collective efforts benefited all claimants, and appointing a Common Fee Review Board to allocate the fund.Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit managed the coordination, administered discovery, approved the settlement, and issued the attorney fee order. Claimant Michael Bates and attorneys Anthony Ranken, Alex Edrenkin, and John Thickstun challenged the court’s authority to issue the fee order, arguing it was void due to lack of jurisdiction, violated constitutional rights, and improperly limited review of fee awards. They appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and petitioned the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi for extraordinary writs.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, after accepting transfer, determined it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and HRS § 602-5(a)(6). The court held that the Circuit Court had authority to issue the fee order based on the ongoing special proceeding and the equitable common fund doctrine. However, three provisions that barred or penalized appeals of fee awards were vacated as they violated statutory and constitutional rights to review. The remainder of the fee order—including the creation of the Common Benefit Fund, the tiered fee schedule, and the processes for fee awards—was affirmed. The constitutional and abuse of discretion challenges were rejected, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the City and County of Honolulu’s first special election for the District IV councilmember seat, held August 8, 2026. The controversy centered on whether the term limit provision in the Revised Charter—which prohibits anyone from being “elected to the office of councilmember for more than two consecutive four-year terms”—barred the incumbent, who had been elected in both 2019 (in a special election following the invalidation of the 2018 results) and 2022, from running again for the 2027–2031 term. The 2019 election had followed a court-ordered re-run between the same two candidates after irregularities invalidated the 2018 contest.After the Acting City Clerk rejected objections to the incumbent’s eligibility, a candidate filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which ruled the incumbent ineligible. Because ballots had already been printed, election officials notified voters that votes for the incumbent would not count toward determining an eligible candidate for the next round. As no candidate received a majority in the August election, officials prepared to advance the top two eligible candidates, excluding the incumbent, to the second special election.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed both the procedural and substantive issues. The court held that the Circuit Court should have dismissed the declaratory judgment action as procedurally improper, because Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 12-8 provided the exclusive remedy for pre-election eligibility challenges. However, the Supreme Court determined it could address the merits under the statutes governing election contests. On the merits, the court concluded the incumbent was “elected to” two consecutive four-year terms and was thus ineligible to run for a third consecutive term under the Revised Charter. The court ordered that only the two eligible candidates be placed on the ballot for the second special election. Judgment was entered for the defendants. View "Iwasa v. Nago" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2008, which were eventually assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In 2015, Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure action against the defendants, alleging default on the mortgage. During the pendency of the proceedings, Wells Fargo assigned the mortgage to UMB Bank, National Association, which was substituted as the plaintiff. A central issue in the case was whether Wells Fargo possessed the original promissory note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed, a requirement for standing to foreclose.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit first denied Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion, finding insufficient admissible evidence of note possession at the time the lawsuit commenced. Later, UMB as successor plaintiff submitted additional declarations and business records in support of a renewed summary judgment motion. The circuit court found these sufficient and ruled in favor of UMB on standing. Shortly before trial, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding certain facts, including that Wells Fargo held the note before the action began and was the current holder, but the stipulation did not specify continuous possession or possession specifically on the complaint’s filing date. The circuit court relied on both the earlier summary judgment ruling and the stipulation, ultimately issuing a foreclosure decree for UMB. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing enforcement of the stipulation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wells Fargo possessed the note when the complaint was filed. The court found the evidence submitted by UMB ambiguous and the stipulation insufficiently specific to establish standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this factual issue. View "UMB Bank, N.A. v. Tupulua" on Justia Law

The petitioner challenged the renewal of an annual permit granted to a hotel operator for the use of state-owned, ceded lands fronting the Kahala Hotel. The permit, which allowed the hotel to use the land for recreational and maintenance purposes, was extended several times by the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). The petitioner requested a contested case hearing (CCH) during a public meeting about the most recent renewal, arguing that the practice of pre-setting lounge chairs on the land discouraged public use. The BLNR denied the request for a hearing and approved the permit renewal. The petitioner appealed this denial.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit affirmed the BLNR’s actions, rejecting the petitioner’s arguments. The petitioner then appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which found that the petitioner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a clean and healthful environment under the Hawai‘i Constitution. The ICA concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a CCH and that the denial of such a hearing violated procedural due process. However, since the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief could be granted, and denied the petitioner’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, finding that the requirements for the doctrine had not yet been satisfied.Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the PAG doctrine does not require a party to obtain further relief before recovering attorney fees, and that all requirements for the doctrine were met. The court ruled that the hotel operator is liable for all reasonable attorney fees incurred by the petitioner during the certiorari proceedings, including fees for seeking fees, and remanded to the ICA to determine the amount of reasonable fees for the appellate stage. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

After a couple ended their relationship, they continued to share custody of a dog they had jointly acquired. This shared arrangement lasted for two years, but in early 2026, one party refused to return the dog as scheduled. The other party then filed a claim in the small claims division of the District Court of the Second Circuit in Hawai‘i, seeking the return of the dog or, alternatively, monetary compensation. The claimant argued she co-owned the dog, had paid for its care, and that money damages would be inadequate. The defendant asserted he assumed full custody after learning the claimant might leave the island and asked the court to confirm his ownership.The District Court of the Second Circuit’s small claims division conducted a trial and found it equitable to grant legal and physical ownership of the dog to the defendant. The court also ordered the defendant to pay the claimant a sum representing half the value of the dog plus half the veterinary bills. The claimant’s motions to set aside the judgment and for reconsideration or new trial were denied, with the court reasoning that she had chosen the forum and was requesting monetary relief.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus, as no appeal is allowed from a small claims judgment. The Supreme Court held that the small claims division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide ownership of the dog because its statutory authority is limited to money claims under $5,000, residential security-deposit disputes, and the return of leased or rented property. The claim for ownership of the dog was not within those categories. The Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the lower court’s ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "Miller v. Collins" on Justia Law

The dispute stems from a series of lawsuits initiated by a borrower after a nonjudicial foreclosure was attempted on a Maui property he purchased in 2003. Following his default on the mortgage in 2008, the property was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure in 2010 and title transferred to a bank. The bank, through its attorneys, sought to evict the borrower and later filed a judicial foreclosure counterclaim after the borrower challenged the foreclosure's validity. The borrower remained in possession of the property throughout, and subsequent litigation centered on the conduct of both the lender and its attorneys.After an initial summary judgment against the borrower in his wrongful foreclosure suit, the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the parties settled most claims except those against certain attorneys. Separately, the borrower filed new claims against the bank’s law firm and its attorneys, alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, wrongful foreclosure, and other torts related to their legal filings and conduct during the foreclosure process. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the attorneys and declared the borrower a vexatious litigant due to a pattern of abusive litigation.On appeal, the ICA affirmed most of the circuit court’s rulings but reinstated the borrower’s claim alleging fraud on the court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the ICA erred by reinstating this claim, reasoning that even if the borrower’s allegations were true, they did not meet the high threshold required for an independent action for fraud on the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of all claims against the attorneys and the vexatious litigant order, and vacated the ICA’s ruling to the extent it had revived the fraud on the court claim. View "Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law

A devastating fire occurred in Lahaina on August 8, 2023, resulting in over one hundred deaths and widespread property and economic damage. Following the fire, individually represented plaintiffs and class action plaintiffs filed lawsuits in state and federal courts against entities including Hawaiian Electric, Kamehameha Schools, the State of Hawaiʻi, and the County of Maui. These class actions were eventually consolidated and refiled as a single case in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. Through court-ordered mediation, parties reached a “global settlement” in August 2024, resolving all claims for a total of $4.037 billion, with a portion allocated to a class settlement fund.Prior to the present appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit coordinated complex proceedings, including appointment of a special settlement master and consolidation of cases. The court issued an order establishing exclusive jurisdiction over subrogation claims related to the settlement. After the settlement was publicized and the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Maui Fire Cases, which clarified that insurers’ exclusive remedy after settlement is a statutory lien under HRS § 663-10, Subrogating Insurers moved to intervene in the class action, claiming protectable equitable subrogation rights if some class members did not file claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi held that Subrogating Insurers do not possess a protectable interest that justifies intervention by right or permissive intervention in the class action settlement under Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24. The court found that the statutory lien process under HRS § 663-10 is the exclusive remedy for insurers, and settlement extinguishes subrogation rights, even if some class members do not claim settlement funds. The court affirmed the Circuit Court’s order denying intervention. View "Burnes v. Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are trustees who own a property in Kīhei, Maui, which they use as a vacation home for personal use. In 2021, Maui County reclassified their property as a “short-term rental” based solely on zoning, not actual use, resulting in a higher property tax rate. The plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes but did not utilize the administrative appeals process available through the Maui County Board of Review. Instead, they filed a class action in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, seeking a refund and alleging that the County’s collection of the higher taxes was unconstitutional, violated due process, and resulted in unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted the County’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 232 and Maui County Code chapter 3.48, the proper procedure for contesting real property tax assessments—including constitutional challenges—requires first appealing to the County Board of Review and, if necessary, then to the Tax Appeal Court. Because the plaintiffs bypassed these required steps and missed the statutory deadline to appeal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Appeal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding real property tax assessments, including those raising constitutional issues, and found that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred due to their failure to timely pursue the established administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Piezko v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law