Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three non-profit corporations, each formed by littoral homeowners in the Portlock neighborhood of East Honolulu, purchased narrow beachfront reserve lots that separated their homes from the ocean. In 2003, Hawai‘i enacted Act 73, which declared certain accreted lands—land gradually added to the shoreline by natural forces—to be public property, preventing private parties from registering or quieting title to such land. Shortly after purchasing the lots, the non-profits (the Ohanas) filed an inverse condemnation action, alleging that Act 73 resulted in an uncompensated taking of accreted land seaward of their lots, in violation of the Hawai‘i Constitution. The parties stipulated that, if a taking occurred, just compensation would be based on the fair market rental value of the accreted land.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially granted partial summary judgment to the Ohanas, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed in part, holding that Act 73 effected a taking of existing accreted lands. On remand, after a bench trial with expert testimony, the circuit court found that the fair market rental value of the accreted land was zero dollars, based on credible evidence that the land’s use was highly restricted and had no market value. The court declined to award nominal damages or attorneys’ fees. The ICA affirmed, finding the circuit court’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that sovereign immunity barred attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment. It held that the circuit court did not err in awarding zero dollars as just compensation, nor in declining to award nominal damages, because the Ohanas suffered no compensable loss. The court further held that the just compensation clause of the Hawai‘i Constitution does not waive sovereign immunity for attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation cases. View "Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a Hawai‘i corporation and one of its directors after the director questioned the validity of a conflict-of-interest clause in the corporation’s articles. The corporation filed a declaratory judgment action against the director, seeking a ruling that the clause was valid. The director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing there was no actual controversy. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, retaining jurisdiction to hear a motion for attorneys’ fees. The director then sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal expenses, relying on both the corporation’s articles and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 414-243, which mandates indemnification for directors who are “wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise,” in defending proceedings brought against them due to their role as directors.The corporation partially indemnified the director for his defense costs but disputed his entitlement to further fees, particularly those incurred in seeking indemnification itself (“fees on fees”). The Circuit Court denied the director’s motion for additional fees, finding he was not “wholly successful” under the statute because the dismissal was without prejudice. The director appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. The ICA concluded that fees on fees were only available when indemnification was court-ordered, which was not the case here, and declined to address whether the director was “wholly successful” under HRS § 414-243.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and reversed both lower courts. It held that a director whose case is dismissed without prejudice and who incurs no liability is “wholly successful” under HRS § 414-243 and thus entitled to mandatory indemnification. The court further held that this statutory indemnification includes reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining indemnification, such as fees on fees. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court to determine the reasonable amount of such expenses. View "Loyalty Development Company, LTD. v. Ching" on Justia Law

Two brothers, Roland and Robert, ran an automotive business together under Guieb Inc. Their relationship deteriorated when Robert made decisions that Roland disagreed with, including using their company for his own benefit and allegedly stealing the trade name and most profitable shop for his personal companies. Roland sued Robert, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices, unfair methods of competition, and deceptive trade practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 480-2 and 481A-3. He also sought punitive damages for fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Robert’s motion for partial summary judgment (MPSJ) and dismissed Roland’s claims under count 12, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted Robert’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on punitive damages, preventing the jury from considering them. Additionally, the court ruled that brotherhood did not establish a fiduciary duty, granting Robert’s MPSJ on that issue as well.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court on three issues. It held that Roland’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim should have gone to the jury, as there was evidence that Robert represented Guieb Inc. and Guieb Group as the same entity. The ICA also held that the jury should have considered punitive damages, given the evidence of Robert’s actions that could justify such damages. Lastly, the ICA found that brotherhood created a kinship fiduciary duty, which should have been considered by the jury.The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed with the ICA that the jury should have considered Roland’s claims under count 12 and punitive damages. However, it disagreed that kinship created a fiduciary duty, affirming the circuit court’s MPSJ on that issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Guieb v. Guieb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) finding that no evidence was introduced at trial to support the jury's findings that Regal Capital Corporation (Regal Corp.) violated the terms of agreements of sale it entered into with Elesther Calipjo for two parcels of land, Regal Capital Co., LLC (Regal LLC) engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices, and Jack Purdy was the alter ego of Regal Corp. and Regal LLC, holding that the ICA's holding was error.Based on the alter ego finding, the jury determined that Purdy, too violated the agreements for the two properties and committed unfair and deceptive acts or practices. The Supreme Court held (1) there was evidence to support the jury's verdict that Regal Corp. violated the terms of the agreements, Regal LLC engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices, and Purdy was the alter ego of Regal Corp. and Regal LLC; and (2) the ICA erred when it reversed the circuit court's final judgment against Purdy on the breach of contract and unfair and deceptive acts or practices claims. View "Calipjo v. Purdy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) partially vacating the circuit court's judgment entering judgment against Plaintiffs in this action alleging that Defendants intentionally misrepresented the value of a limousine service, holding that some of the rulings of the trial court in this complex commercial dispute involving the sale of the business were in error.The Lacy Parties represented Goran and Ana Maria Pleho in purchasing the business. The transaction was completed in the name of Goran PLeho LLC (GPLLC). After the purchase, the Plehos and GPLLC (collectively, Pleho Parties) sued, alleging that Lacy Parties intentionally misrepresented the value of the business. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the circuit court's dismissal of Pleho Parties' intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims and the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Lacy Parties on GPLLC's fraud and punitive damages claims; (2) vacated the ICA's judgment to the extent that it vacated the circuit court's order denying Lacy Parties' motion in limine; and (3) vacated the ICA's judgment to the extent that it affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Lacy Parties on the Pleho's unfair and deceptive trade practices claim. View "Goran Pleho, LLC v. Lacy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court’s order and granting summary judgment for Defendant in this case arising out of the uncompleted sale of one business to another, holding that the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to its unfair method of competition (UMOC) claim.Specifically, the Court held (1) to raise an issue of material fact as to the nature of the competition requirement of a UMOC claim following the close of discovery, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged anticompetitive conduct could negatively affect competition, but the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant in fact harmed competition; (2) to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff may generally describe the relevant market without resort to expert testimony and need not be a competitor of or in competition with the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff in this case raised genuine issues of material fact as to the first and second elements of a UMOC claim, and the circuit court erred erred in holding that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting the UMOC claim based on waiver, judicial estoppel and collateral estoppel. View "Field v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n" on Justia Law

This appeal was the most recent development in litigation concerning the ownership and control of the Marn family business. Alexander Marn sought a declaratory judgment and specific performance regarding his rights to the business. Despite a jury demand, the circuit court held a bench trial. Thereafter, the circuit court entered partial final judgment against Alexander. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the circuit court did not err in conducting a bench trial instead of a jury trial. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal, holding that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the circuit court’s decision to conduct a bench trial, as Alexander was entitled to a jury trial on his declaratory judgment action, and a jury trial was properly demanded and preserved. Remanded. View "In re Marn Family Litigation" on Justia Law

In 1994, Investors Equity Life Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. (IEL) was liquidated. The State Insurance Commission was appointed as IEL’s liquidator (Liquidator). In 1996, Investors Equity Life Holding Company (IELHC), the former parent company and sole shareholder of IEL, surrendered all of its shares in IEL to the Commissioner as part of a settlement agreement to resolve claims relating to IEL’s insolvency. The Liquidator proceeded to administer IEL’s estate. In 2008, IELHC wrote to the Liquidator claiming that it held legal or equitable title to all of IEL’s stock and demanding that the Liquidator turn over to IELHC all shares and assets remaining in IEL’s estate. The Liquidator denied the claim. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that IELHC asserted a claim against IEL’s estate and that the claim was time barred; (2) the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over IELHC’s claim and personal jurisdiction over IELHC; (3) there were no grounds for abating the adjudication of IELHC’s claim; and (4) the circuit court’s procedures met due process requirements. View "Ito v. Investors Equity Life Holding Co." on Justia Law

Ralph Mitchell, a condominium owner in the Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay (“AOAO”), submitted a petition to the AOAO to conduct a special meeting of the AOAO to remove one or more of the AOAO Board members. The AOAO filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the petition did not contain at least twenty-five percent of the owners’ signatures, and therefore, there was no basis for conducting a special meeting. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the AOAO. The AOAO subsequently sought fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-157(a) and (b). The circuit court granted the motion. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the AOAO’s refusal to mediate the dispute precluded it from an entitlement of any fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-161(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded for a determination of whether section 514B-161(a) applies in this case and, if so, directed the circuit court to take into consideration such refusal in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Marn Family Litigation, which had been ongoing for nearly fifteen years and concerned the ownership and control of the Marn family business. Petitioner Alexander Marn filed the instant appeal before the Supreme Court pro se before the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The ICA dismissed Alexander’s appeal for failure to comply with the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure in his opening brief. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA’s dismissal of Alexander’s appeal without notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond was a violation of Haw. R. App. P. 30. Remanded. View "In re Marn Family Litig." on Justia Law