Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals rejecting Defendant’s contention that the district court abused its discretion in not dismissing with prejudice the charges against Petitioner based upon a violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. 48. The district court dismissed the charges against Petitioner without prejudice. Before the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the charges were not serious as a matter of law and that the State should have been precluded from reinstituting prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, holding that, based on the record in this case, and in light of the applicable principles that guide a court in the exercise of its discretion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges against Defendant without prejudice. View "State v. Fukuoka" on Justia Law

The County of Maui’s land use regulations did not constitute a regulatory taking of property owned by Plaintiffs.Plaintiffs brought suit against the County arguing that the County’s land use regulations and restrictions prevented them from building a family house on their beachfront lot. Plaintiffs asserted that the County’s actions constituted a regulatory taking for which they were entitled to just compensation. The jury delivered a verdict in favor of the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict in favor of the County; and (2) the circuit court’s order granting in part and denying in part the County’s motion for costs was not in error. View "Leone v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court prospectively held that when a party to a circuit court civil case timely appeals a purportedly appealable final judgment that is later determined not to meet the appealability requirements of Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 869 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Haw. 1994), rather than dismiss the appeal, the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) must temporarily remand the case to the circuit court for entry of an appealable final judgment and directions to supplement the record on appeal with the final judgment.The Supreme Court held that the ICA did not err in dismissing Defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Defendant’s third notice of appeal was untimely and because the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Defendant’s second notice of appeal because she did not seek certiorari review of that dismissal. Although the court lacked jurisdiction over this case, the dismissal of Defendant’s second notice of appeal and the circumstances of the case led to the court’s reexamination of its previous mandate that appeals be dismissed when a purported circuit court final judgment fails to meet appealability requirements. View "State v. Joshua" on Justia Law

In this case raising two questions concerning Hawaii law of workers’ compensation as it relates to permanent partial disability (PPD) awards, the Supreme Court held (1) a PPD award for an unscheduled injury that is not comparable to a scheduled injury must be supported by some factual finding of a determinate percentage of impairment of a physical or mental function of the whole person; and (2) a PPD determination may be based on a claimant’s post-injury inability to perform the usual and customary work activities in the position the claimant occupied prior to the injury.In the instant case, the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) awarded Employee $250 in PPD benefits. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated LIRAB’s ruling and remanded for a determination of whether Employee had suffered a permanent impairment and, if so, the percentage of the impairment and the award of PPD benefits based on that percentage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the Board’s $250 lump sum award and remanded to LIRAB for it to determine the relevant percentage of Employee’s impairment, as well as an award of PPD benefits based on that percentage. View "Ihara v. State" on Justia Law

After a joint trial, the jury found Lawrence Bruce guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree and found Justin McKinley guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated Bruce’s and McKinley’s convictions and remanded their cases for new trials, concluding that one of the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal closing argument constituted misconduct and that the misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s judgment, holding that the prosecutor’s comments, when properly analyzed in context, were not improper because they were relevant to the fundamental issues at trial. View "State v. Bruce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioners’ request for costs but denied their request for an award of attorney’s fees in their action against the State of Hawaii and the State of Hawaii Department of Transportation. The Supreme Court held (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 662-9 allows a court to award attorney’s fees only to the extent permitted under Haw. Rev. Stat. 662-12; (2) Petitioners’ request for recovery of attorney’s fees under section 662-9 and 662-12 is premature; and (3) Haw. Rev. Stat. 662-9 authorizes the award of costs against the State, and Petitioners are the prevailing parties under section 662-9. View "O’Grady v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were appropriate procedures for cases in which a trial court provides a “sentencing inclination.” In this opinion, the Supreme Court discussed procedures trial judges should follow before providing sentencing inclinations. Further, the court prospectively held that if a defendant pleads guilty or no contest in response to a court’s sentencing inclination and the court subsequently decides not to follow the inclination, the court must provide the defendant with the opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty or no contest.Here, the Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate court of appeals’ judgment affirming the circuit court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence, holding that because Defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea after acknowledging the non-binding nature of the circuit court’s sentencing inclination, and because the circuit court provided sufficient reasons for its deviation from the original sentencing inclination, Defendant was not entitled to be resentenced pursuant to the court’s original sentencing inclination. View "State v. Sanney" on Justia Law

In this arbitrability dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the intermediate court of appeals’ (ICA) order denying Petitioners’ request for appellate attorneys’ fees and affirmed the portions of the ICA’s order granting Petitioners’ request for appellate costs and denying Petitioners’ request for fees and costs incurred in the circuit court without prejudice. The court held (1) for purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 607-14, the appeal of the arbitrability issue is a separate action from the underlying dispute on the merits; (2) Petitioners prevailed in the arbitrability action and were therefore entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees under section 607-14 and a fee-shifting provision in a purchase agreement; and (3) as to Petitioners’ request for an order stating that they were entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in proceedings before the circuit court and in arbitration, the circuit court properly denied without prejudice to Petitioners’ right to request fees and costs from the circuit court. View "Charles v. Kapalua Bay, LLC " on Justia Law

Commercial aquarium collection pursuant to permits issued under Haw. Rev. Stat. 188-31 and the Department of Land and Natural Resource’s (DLNR) administrative rules is subject to the environmental review procedures provided in the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). The circuit court determined that, as a matter of law, aquarium collection is not an applicant “action” that triggers HEPA. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts with respect to commercial aquarium collection permits, holding that aquarium collection pursuant to commercial and recreational permits issued by DLNR is a HEPA “action” and thus subject to HEPA environmental review. The court remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings to resolve the issue of whether recreational aquarium collection under section 188-31 and DLNR’s administrative rules is also subject to HEPA. View "Umberger v. Department of Land & Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the intermediate court of appeals’ (ICA) judgment denying without prejudice Philip Kozma’s request for attorneys’ fees related to his appeal but vacated the portion of the ICA’s judgment denying costs. The appeal was related to a foreclosure action brought by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. The circuit court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure. On appeal, the ICA vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Upon Kozma’s request seeking attorney’s fees and costs related to his appeal, the ICA determined that Kozma was not a “prevailing party’ at this point in the proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) the ICA did not err in denying Kozma’s request for attorney’s fees because there was no “prevailing party” entitled to such fees under Haw. Rev. Sat. 607-14; but (2) the ICA incorrectly concluded that Kozma was not entitled to costs pursuant to Haw. R. App. P. 39. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Kozma" on Justia Law