Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman in a long-term, unmarried same-gender relationship helped plan and raise a child with her partner, including choosing the child’s name, sharing caregiving responsibilities, and being recognized as a parent by others. The child was conceived via sperm donation from the woman’s cousin, who understood that he was not to be a parent. The woman was not listed on the birth certificate and had not adopted the child. After the couple separated, the biological mother restricted the woman’s access to the child and eventually moved out of state with the child.After the separation, the woman filed a petition in the Family Court of the First Circuit to establish legal parentage based on Hawai‘i’s “holding out” presumption under HRS § 584-4(a)(4), which presumes parentage for a person who receives a child into their home and holds them out as their own. The family court found that she had held the child out as her own but concluded she could not establish legal parentage as a matter of law because the statute’s language was gender-specific and she was neither married to the biological mother nor the child’s biological parent. The court granted her temporary visitation as a de facto parent but denied her request for legal parentage and for the child’s return to Hawai‘i.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, parentage presumptions must be applied in a gender-neutral manner insofar as practicable, including the “holding out” presumption. The Court vacated the family court’s findings and conclusions denying legal parentage, directed that legal parentage be established for the woman, and remanded for proceedings regarding custody and visitation. View "JK v. HK." on Justia Law

A private company operating a hotel sought the renewal of a one-year, revocable state land permit for property fronting its hotel. A member of the public, who had long used the area for recreation, objected to the permit's renewal, particularly the practice of presetting hotel lounge chairs, which he argued deterred public use. He requested a formal contested case hearing on the permit renewal, asserting a property interest in the recreational and environmental quality of the public land. The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) denied his request for such a hearing, instead allowing only written and oral testimony at a public meeting.The objector appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which upheld the BLNR's denial, finding that he had been afforded due process through the public meeting process. On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in a clean and healthful environment and was entitled to a contested case hearing before the permit could be renewed. Because the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief, if any, remained available. The ICA granted costs but denied the appellant’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, reasoning that the requirements for such fees were unmet since the scope of relief was not yet determined.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s denial of attorney fees. The court held that the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain final relief before becoming eligible for attorney fees. Determining that all three prongs of the PAG test were met, the court remanded the matter for the ICA to determine the reasonableness of the appellant’s attorney fees and whether the hotel company was liable for them. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

Spa workers including massage therapists, estheticians, nail technicians, fitness instructors, and hair stylists were employed at a hotel in South Maui. The hotel required them to work a minimum number of hours and shifts each week, but compensated them solely through commissions based on services provided to clients. When no clients were present, workers were still required to remain on-site and perform other tasks such as cleaning, laundering linens, sweeping floors, taking inventory, and staffing a retail store. Plaintiffs alleged that this unpaid work often comprised most or all of their scheduled shifts, and they received no compensation for those hours.Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaiʻi, alleging, among other claims, that the hotel failed to pay minimum wage as required by Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 387-2 and 387-12. The District Court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, asking whether minimum wage compliance and damages under Hawaiʻi law should be assessed using a per-hour measure, as specified in the state statutes, or using a per-workweek unit, as under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi answered the certified question, holding that Hawaiʻi’s minimum wage law requires employers to pay at least the statutory minimum wage for each hour worked. The court found the statutory language “per hour” to be unambiguous and rejected the workweek-averaging approach used under the FLSA. Compliance and damages must be measured per hour, not averaged over a workweek. Workweek averaging is not permitted under HRS §§ 387-2 and 387-12. View "Bolos v. Waldorf=Astoria Management LLC." on Justia Law

A per diem judge had been credited with retirement service by the Employee Retirement System (ERS) for years under a 1990 memorandum that set eligibility criteria. In 2017, the ERS discovered that the Judiciary had not updated personnel forms as the memorandum appeared to require. Without notice or a hearing, ERS issued a new memorandum rescinding the 1990 policy and retroactively stripped the judge’s retirement credits for service after October 1, 2017. The ERS did not follow rulemaking procedures required by Hawaii’s Administrative Procedure Act.The judge administratively challenged the ERS decision. A hearing officer partially sided with her, but the Board of Trustees of the ERS overruled that recommendation and dismissed all claims. The judge appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which reversed the ERS Board, finding that both the 1990 and 2017 memoranda were rules under HRS § 91-1 and invalid because they had not been properly promulgated. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, agreeing that the memoranda were improperly issued but holding that the circuit court’s reasoning did not support the relief granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that both the 1990 and 2017 memoranda were rules affecting private rights, not mere internal management or intra-agency communications, and thus subject to statutory rulemaking procedures. The 2017 memorandum and its implementing letter were void as to the judge because they were not lawfully adopted and she had timely challenged them. However, because no timely challenge was made to the 1990 memorandum, it remained valid and controlled her eligibility. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s decision, reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, and ordered the ERS to credit the judge for eligible service. View "Martel v. Employee Retirement System" on Justia Law

A substitute teacher sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old student on multiple occasions in a classroom, recorded at least two of the assaults, and shared one of the videos with adults in an online chatroom. The Federal Bureau of Investigation found child pornography on his phone and evidence of further distribution. The student confirmed multiple instances of abuse, which significantly impacted his mental health. The teacher was subsequently federally prosecuted and sentenced to seventeen and a half years for production of child pornography. In parallel state proceedings, he was indicted on several charges, pled guilty to three, and was sentenced to an aggregate thirty years in prison, with some terms ordered to run consecutively and concurrently.In the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the court granted the State’s oral motion for consecutive sentences at sentencing but provided only a brief, generalized rationale focused on the teacher-student relationship and harm to the victim. It did not address the distinct nature of the offenses or provide a detailed explanation for departing from the presumptive concurrent sentencing. After the defendant appealed, the court issued a written order—drafted by the prosecution and adopted verbatim—offering a more comprehensive justification for the consecutive sentences. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the sentence, relying heavily on this post-sentencing written order.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s judgment and the portion of the circuit court’s sentence imposing consecutive terms. The court held that a sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on the record at the time of sentencing, not in a later written order, and must not simply adopt the prosecutor’s arguments. The case was remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. View "State v. Bunag" on Justia Law

A purchaser entered into a condominium sales contract with a developer, which incorporated an escrow agreement between the developer and an escrow company. The purchaser was not a signatory to the escrow agreement, nor was the escrow company a party to the sales contract. After the purchaser defaulted on the sales contract by failing to make the required closing payment, the developer sent notices of default and contract termination, copying the escrow company. The termination notices included instructions regarding the disposition of the purchaser’s escrowed deposits—one letter indicated the developer would retain fifteen percent of the purchase price as liquidated damages, while a later letter stated the intent to retain the entire deposit. The escrow company subsequently released the entire escrow balance to the developer.Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the escrow company on the purchaser’s claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that the escrow company had complied with the escrow agreement as incorporated into the sales contract. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed denial of the purchaser’s partial summary judgment motion but vacated summary judgment for the escrow company on the breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. The ICA found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the escrow company breached its duties by releasing all funds after receiving what it characterized as conflicting instructions from the developer.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the escrow company strictly complied with the terms of the escrow agreement, which, upon default and proper written notice, required release of all escrowed funds to the developer. The court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding breach of contract or fiduciary duty. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment regarding those claims and affirmed summary judgment for the escrow company, remanding only the issue of attorney fees to the ICA. View "Yamaguchi v. Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute stems from a series of lawsuits initiated by a borrower after a nonjudicial foreclosure was attempted on a Maui property he purchased in 2003. Following his default on the mortgage in 2008, the property was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure in 2010 and title transferred to a bank. The bank, through its attorneys, sought to evict the borrower and later filed a judicial foreclosure counterclaim after the borrower challenged the foreclosure's validity. The borrower remained in possession of the property throughout, and subsequent litigation centered on the conduct of both the lender and its attorneys.After an initial summary judgment against the borrower in his wrongful foreclosure suit, the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the parties settled most claims except those against certain attorneys. Separately, the borrower filed new claims against the bank’s law firm and its attorneys, alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, wrongful foreclosure, and other torts related to their legal filings and conduct during the foreclosure process. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the attorneys and declared the borrower a vexatious litigant due to a pattern of abusive litigation.On appeal, the ICA affirmed most of the circuit court’s rulings but reinstated the borrower’s claim alleging fraud on the court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the ICA erred by reinstating this claim, reasoning that even if the borrower’s allegations were true, they did not meet the high threshold required for an independent action for fraud on the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of all claims against the attorneys and the vexatious litigant order, and vacated the ICA’s ruling to the extent it had revived the fraud on the court claim. View "Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law

A devastating fire occurred in Lahaina on August 8, 2023, resulting in over one hundred deaths and widespread property and economic damage. Following the fire, individually represented plaintiffs and class action plaintiffs filed lawsuits in state and federal courts against entities including Hawaiian Electric, Kamehameha Schools, the State of Hawaiʻi, and the County of Maui. These class actions were eventually consolidated and refiled as a single case in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. Through court-ordered mediation, parties reached a “global settlement” in August 2024, resolving all claims for a total of $4.037 billion, with a portion allocated to a class settlement fund.Prior to the present appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit coordinated complex proceedings, including appointment of a special settlement master and consolidation of cases. The court issued an order establishing exclusive jurisdiction over subrogation claims related to the settlement. After the settlement was publicized and the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Maui Fire Cases, which clarified that insurers’ exclusive remedy after settlement is a statutory lien under HRS § 663-10, Subrogating Insurers moved to intervene in the class action, claiming protectable equitable subrogation rights if some class members did not file claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi held that Subrogating Insurers do not possess a protectable interest that justifies intervention by right or permissive intervention in the class action settlement under Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24. The court found that the statutory lien process under HRS § 663-10 is the exclusive remedy for insurers, and settlement extinguishes subrogation rights, even if some class members do not claim settlement funds. The court affirmed the Circuit Court’s order denying intervention. View "Burnes v. Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of a car rental company was involved in a motor vehicle collision while working as a transporter, driving a van on company property. The employee was at a complete stop when another vehicle reversed into the van. She reported that her nose struck the steering wheel during the collision, and subsequently experienced pain and symptoms affecting the right side of her face and nose. Medical records from the days following the accident documented her complaints of facial pain, sinus pain, and nasal congestion, and x-ray imaging taken one week after the incident revealed a nondisplaced right-sided nasal fracture. The employer accepted liability for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder, but denied that the nasal injury was caused by the collision.The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations found the nasal injury to be compensable under Hawaii’s workers’ compensation law. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) reviewed the case and, based largely on the opinions of two medical examiners selected by the employer, reversed the Director’s decision regarding the nasal fracture. LIRAB concluded that the employer had presented substantial evidence that the nasal injury was not caused by the collision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed LIRAB’s decision, agreeing that credible medical testimony supported the employer’s position.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii reviewed the case and held that the employer failed to meet its initial burden of producing substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the employee’s nasal injury was work-related. The Supreme Court found that the biomechanics opinions relied on by LIRAB lacked proper foundation and did not constitute substantial evidence. The Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ judgment and the relevant portions of LIRAB’s decision and affirmed the Director’s finding that the nasal injury was compensable, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lane v. Avis Budget Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are trustees who own a property in Kīhei, Maui, which they use as a vacation home for personal use. In 2021, Maui County reclassified their property as a “short-term rental” based solely on zoning, not actual use, resulting in a higher property tax rate. The plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes but did not utilize the administrative appeals process available through the Maui County Board of Review. Instead, they filed a class action in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, seeking a refund and alleging that the County’s collection of the higher taxes was unconstitutional, violated due process, and resulted in unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted the County’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 232 and Maui County Code chapter 3.48, the proper procedure for contesting real property tax assessments—including constitutional challenges—requires first appealing to the County Board of Review and, if necessary, then to the Tax Appeal Court. Because the plaintiffs bypassed these required steps and missed the statutory deadline to appeal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Appeal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding real property tax assessments, including those raising constitutional issues, and found that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred due to their failure to timely pursue the established administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Piezko v. County of Maui" on Justia Law