Justia Hawaii Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two commissioners of a state elections oversight body sought a writ of mandamus to compel the agency they supervise to provide administrative support necessary for the commission to convene meetings. The commission had been unable to meet for several months due to the absence of a chairperson and lack of direct contact information among members. The agency, which maintains the commission’s mailing list and facilitates communications, refused to provide support unless requested by a chairperson or by majority vote at a public meeting. This deadlock prevented the commission from fulfilling its statutory duties, including selecting a new chairperson.The commissioners repeatedly asked the agency for staff support and access to the mailing list, but these requests were denied. They then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, arguing that their inability to meet stemmed directly from the agency’s refusal to provide required administrative assistance. The agency argued that only a chairperson or a majority vote could trigger its duty to provide support, and later shifted its position to suggest that a joint request from five members outside a formal meeting would suffice.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that when the commission lacks a chairperson and cannot convene a meeting, any single member may request the agency’s staff support to schedule and notice a meeting. The agency must comply with such requests, enabling the commission to meet and select a chairperson pro tem by majority vote. The court granted the writ of mandamus, clarifying that this rule ensures the commission can carry out its duties and the public’s right to open government is protected. View "Cushnie v. Nago" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an individual with heart disease and his family rented a property in Kauaʻi. The rental agreement required weekly cleanings by staff. Due to his health condition, the tenant requested an accommodation to waive the cleaning provision, fearing increased risk if exposed to the virus by non-family members. The landlord denied the request, suggesting instead that the tenant could leave during cleanings. After further correspondence and formal requests for accommodation, the landlord terminated the tenancy and withheld a portion of the security deposit for cleaning and repairs.After vacating the property, the tenants filed a complaint with the Hawaiʻi Civil Rights Commission (HCRC), alleging disability discrimination for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and to engage in an interactive process. The HCRC found reasonable cause, issued a right to sue, and subsequently initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court granted the landlord’s motion to dismiss, finding the accommodation request was not sufficiently alleged as reasonable and necessary, and that Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law did not create standalone liability for failing to engage in an interactive process.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the “disability,” “necessary,” and “reasonable” factors. The landlord then sought review by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case, clarifying the legal framework for evaluating disability accommodation requests under Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law. The court held that plaintiffs bear the initial burden to show an accommodation is both reasonable and necessary, after which the burden shifts to defendants to prove unreasonableness, including proposing alternatives. The court further held that neither Hawaiʻi’s fair housing statute nor its regulations impose standalone liability for failure to engage in an interactive process. View "Kawatachi v. The Parrish Collection, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman reported being sexually assaulted by a man with whom she had socialized during an evening out. She alleged that the man engaged in acts that constituted sexual assault and attempted sexual assault in the second degree, including penetration, and later reported significant emotional distress and physical harm. The man was indicted on several felony charges, but through plea negotiations, he agreed to plead no contest to a misdemeanor charge of sexual assault in the fourth degree, specifically for exposing his genitals in a manner likely to alarm or cause fear, in exchange for dismissal of the more serious charges.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit accepted the no contest plea but denied the defendant’s motion to defer acceptance of the plea (DANC), which would have allowed him to avoid a criminal conviction if he complied with certain conditions. The court sentenced him to probation, emphasizing the impact on the victim rather than considering allegations of penetration or lack of remorse. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court improperly considered dismissed charges and his alleged lack of remorse. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the trial court acted within its discretion and did not improperly rely on the dismissed charges or lack of remorse.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed both the circuit court’s judgment and the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that trial courts may not consider dismissed charges at sentencing, even if a plea agreement purports to allow it, as this violates constitutional rights. The court also prospectively held that lack of remorse cannot be used against defendants who plead no contest, due to their limited right against self-incrimination, establishing a new rule applicable to future cases. View "State v. Gaeta" on Justia Law

An individual operated a bed and breakfast (B&B) on Maui under a permit requiring compliance with local regulations and that the owner reside on the property. In 2020, neighbors repeatedly complained to the Maui Department of Planning about noise and the owner’s absence during guest stays. Police were called, and the department investigated, finding evidence that the permit conditions had been violated—including the owner’s own admission that he sometimes stayed elsewhere and evidence of noncompliance with quiet hours and COVID-19 regulations. The department revoked the B&B permit and imposed a two-year ban on future permit applications. The owner appealed this decision to the Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals (BVA), which after several hearings and delays, ultimately upheld the department’s decision.After the BVA announced its decision orally on November 24, 2021, it did not adopt and file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law (FOF/COL) until January 2022, exceeding a 45-day deadline specified in the BVA’s procedural rules. The owner appealed to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the BVA’s delay violated its own rules and required reversal. The circuit court affirmed the BVA’s decision, finding the owner in violation of permit conditions and upholding the ban.On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the BVA’s failure to comply with the 45-day rule was a mandatory violation warranting reversal, and that the delay prejudiced the owner’s substantial rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the 45-day deadline in the BVA’s rules is directory, not mandatory, because the rule does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. The court further found that the owner did not suffer prejudice to substantial rights due to the delay. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and reinstated the circuit court’s decision upholding the permit revocation and ban. View "Norrie v. Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals" on Justia Law

After reports and investigations of sexual abuse allegations against a father, the State’s Department of Human Services (DHS) petitioned for foster custody of his children. The family court consolidated the cases, and in September 2024, it issued orders granting DHS foster custody and incorporating a Service Plan that required the father to participate in sex abuse treatment. Importantly, the plan mandated that he “acknowledge and take responsibility for the sexual abuse to his victims” as a condition of successful completion.The father appealed these orders to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i (ICA), which affirmed the family court's decision. Due to complications with his legal representation, the father’s application for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i was filed late, but the Supreme Court agreed to consider the merits, recognizing his constitutional right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed whether the State can require a parent, as part of mandated rehabilitation therapy in child custody proceedings, to make incriminating disclosures. The court held that under Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, the State may not require a parent to admit to criminal misconduct as a condition of completing court-ordered therapy, as this violates the privilege against self-incrimination. However, the court clarified that if a parent’s silence or refusal to admit abuse hinders effective therapy, the court may consider that as a factor in custody determinations without violating the constitutional privilege. The court vacated the lower courts’ orders to the extent they required the father to admit to sexual abuse, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The lower courts’ orders were otherwise affirmed. View "In re: T.J." on Justia Law

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

A man was subject to a one-year protective order issued by a family court. He was later charged with two counts of violating this order, based on allegations that he approached the petitioner’s workplace and contacted her in prohibited ways. The man had attended the hearing at which the protective order was issued. At trial, after the State presented its case, the defense argued that personal service of the order was required for a violation, even though the man was present when the order was issued. The State argued that his presence at the hearing provided sufficient notice.The Family Court of the Second Circuit agreed with the defense, concluding that personal service was an element of the offense and that the State had not established this element. The family court acquitted the defendant, entering a judgment of acquittal and dismissing the case. The State appealed, contending that the judgment of acquittal was actually an order sustaining a motion to dismiss and was therefore appealable. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) disagreed, holding that the ruling was an acquittal based on the court’s determination that the State failed to prove an element of the charge, making the appeal unreviewable.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that service is not an element of the offense of violating an order for protection under HRS § 586-11. The court found that the family court erred in interpreting the statute but that the acquittal, even if based on legal error, barred retrial under Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal of the State’s appeal. View "State v. Chau" on Justia Law

Following the devastating 2023 Lahaina wildfires in Maui, which caused significant loss of life and property, numerous victims initiated litigation against various parties including Hawaiian Electric, the State of Hawaiʻi, the County of Maui, and others. To manage the complex and large-scale proceedings, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit established a special coordination proceeding, appointed liaison counsel, and ultimately oversaw a $4.037 billion global settlement. A major issue arose regarding attorney fees: the court issued an order capping contingency fees, creating a $222 million Common Benefit Fund for attorneys whose collective efforts benefited all claimants, and appointing a Common Fee Review Board to allocate the fund.Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit managed the coordination, administered discovery, approved the settlement, and issued the attorney fee order. Claimant Michael Bates and attorneys Anthony Ranken, Alex Edrenkin, and John Thickstun challenged the court’s authority to issue the fee order, arguing it was void due to lack of jurisdiction, violated constitutional rights, and improperly limited review of fee awards. They appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and petitioned the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi for extraordinary writs.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, after accepting transfer, determined it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and HRS § 602-5(a)(6). The court held that the Circuit Court had authority to issue the fee order based on the ongoing special proceeding and the equitable common fund doctrine. However, three provisions that barred or penalized appeals of fee awards were vacated as they violated statutory and constitutional rights to review. The remainder of the fee order—including the creation of the Common Benefit Fund, the tiered fee schedule, and the processes for fee awards—was affirmed. The constitutional and abuse of discretion challenges were rejected, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the principal members of a defense contracting company after Martin Kao, who had become the CEO and major owner, was charged with crimes related to fraudulent misuse of Paycheck Protection Program funds. The company, which relied on government contracts requiring strict security clearance, suffered significant harm when Kao’s actions led to the invalidation of its facility security clearance and placed it at risk of suspension from federal contracting. The original owner and another entity sought Kao’s disassociation and damages, citing breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and gross negligence. The parties were bound by an operating agreement requiring arbitration for disputes.After a civil complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, an amended operating agreement and voting trust limited Kao’s control, but the company continued to face loss of contracts and financial harm. Arbitration proceedings began, but Kao, citing pending federal criminal charges, unsuccessfully moved to stay the arbitration, arguing his rights against self-incrimination would be prejudiced. The arbitrator denied the stay and ultimately awarded significant damages, including punitive damages, to the plaintiffs.Kao moved to vacate the arbitration award in circuit court, arguing the arbitrator erred in refusing to postpone and in awarding punitive damages. The circuit court denied the motion, finding no “sufficient cause” for postponement and affirming the arbitrator’s authority. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) largely affirmed, holding the arbitrator did not abuse discretion and the punitive damages award was within authority.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the proper standard for “sufficient cause for postponement” under Hawai‘i law is “good cause,” and articulated three factors for courts to consider, grounded in the Hawai‘i Constitution. Applying these, the court found Kao had not met the standard, and affirmed the ICA’s judgment. View "Navatek Capital Inc. v. Kao" on Justia Law

Several Central and South American banana plantation workers brought suit alleging that their health was harmed due to exposure to the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP). One plaintiff, Fernando Jimenez Arias, worked as a quality fruit inspector for a Del Monte subsidiary in Costa Rica from 1971 to 1973. His duties included rotating among various farms, sometimes entering banana fields, and sleeping in warehouses where agricultural chemicals were stored, though he never directly handled or observed the application of DBCP. Arias and his wife experienced reproductive issues, including infertility and miscarriages, which they attributed to DBCP exposure.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Dow Chemical Company’s motions for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert, Michael J. DiBartolomeis, concluding there was no evidence Arias was exposed to DBCP or that such exposure caused his injuries. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. joined in these motions. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated these orders, holding that Arias’s testimony and other evidence raised genuine issues of material fact regarding exposure and causation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on certiorari. It affirmed the ICA’s decision, holding that Arias had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of possible DBCP exposure and that the expert’s testimony was admissible. The court adopted a new approach for causation in toxic tort cases, following the Restatement (Third) of Torts: first, the plaintiff must show exposure to the agent; second, general causation; and third, specific causation. The court clarified that expert testimony is required and that no rigid dosage proof is necessary. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Patrickson v. DOW Chemical Company" on Justia Law